Five years after the deadlines set out in the 1996 Agreement, the Armm Agreement took effect on 31 March 2001 and the Government decided to hold the referendum in August 2001. MNLF leader and regional governor Nur Misuari called for the referendum to be postponed for another three years, fearing that development projects had not had time to succeed and that voters would supplant him as leader and choose to join the expanded DMARD.1 The referendum was held as planned in August 2001. Of the 14 provinces and 9 cities of SZOPAD, only one other province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) voted to live in the new expanded DMARD. Only Misuari was replaced as governor and replaced by Parouk Hussin.2 The 1996 agreement calls on the ARMM Regional Assembly (which was not established in 1996) to set up Sharia courts and Islamic schools. Sharia courts and Islamic schools already existed in the ARMM before the 1996 peace agreement and provided a basis for increasing or decreasing the frequency of both institutions. In an interview with Judge Alauya, a Sharia judge, in 1994, he indicated that there are currently five Sharia District Courts and 31 Sharia District Courts in the ARMM and that judges in Saudi Arabia are receiving their Sharia training.1 The OIC General Secretariat, the third verification body elected in the 1996 Peace Agreement, received an official report from the GRP of December 2005, in the article on the five main articles of implementation by the GRP of Phase II of the Peace Agreement. The integration of MNLF candidates into the Philippine National Police (PNP) did not begin until 1996. Neither the PNP Regional Command for the New Autonomous Region nor the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) was established in 1996. In an attempt to defuse the controversy surrounding the agreement`s provisions – particularly the proposal for an MNLF-led Council to oversee peace and development initiatives in 14 provinces – the government and MNLF leaders have fuelled expectations of spectacular economic development. Subsequently, it was the MNLF – without sufficient financial or legal resources – that had to bear the burden of meeting these expectations. The government clearly expected that the 1996 agreement would help bring other insurgent groups, in particular the MILF, into the Constitution.

For the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), he redefined military possibilities. Shortly after September 1996, AFP appeared to be effectively concentrating its forces on attacking camps. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a mnlf group that had withdrawn in 1977, initially supported the MNLF during peace talks. But they rejected the final peace agreement of 1996 as insufficient and reiterated the call for an „Islamic State of Bangsamoro“ and not just mere political autonomy. [5] In the same year, the MILF began informal discussions with the Ramos-led government. However, the latter were not followed and the MILF began to recruit and establish camps and became a dominant Muslim rebel group. Joseph Estrada`s government had a tough stance towards the MILF; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo`s attempted to sign a peace agreement with her, but it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. [6] No additional changes were made to the armm`s provincial boundaries following the last referendum in August 2001. The 1996 agreement set out a plan to integrate at least 5,750 MNLF fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), of which another 250 are expected to be trained in aid units.

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